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THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION
REFORM ACT AND THE ENTREPRENEUR:
PROTECTING NAÏVE ISSUERS FROM
SOPHISTICATED INVESTORS
Robert Sprague* and Karen L. Page**

INTRODUCTION
The purpose of U.S. securities laws is to protect investors by requiring
full disclosure on the part of the issuers of securities. The intent is to increase
the efﬁciency and integrity of the nation’s capital markets by ensuring that all
material information is publicly available. Thus, the laws were created and have
been amended to provide legal redress for investors who were not provided with
sufﬁcient information to make a reasoned decision. In most respects, these laws
presume relative naïveté on the part of the investors and relative knowledge and
power on the part of the issuers.
There is evidence suggesting, however, that in the sphere of new ventures,
the balance of power may be tipped in favor of the investors and away from the
issuers. Indeed, it is often the case that entrepreneurs, though expert in their
substantive ﬁeld, tend to be naïve in ﬁnancial and business matters. Investors,
particularly venture capitalists, on the other hand, tend to be experienced and
knowledgeable in ﬁnancial matters. In these circumstances, there was a threat that
securities laws could exacerbate the power imbalance in favor of the investors and
leave the entrepreneurs vulnerable to unfair dealing. Speciﬁcally, because of the
tenuous ﬁnancial position of new ventures, any heavy-handedness on the part of
* J.D., M.B.A., Assistant Professor, Department of Management & Marketing, University of
Wyoming College of Business.
** Ph.D., J.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Management & Marketing, University of
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Kauffman Foundation. The contents of this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors. The
authors wish to thank Michael Thatcher, J.D., 2006, University of Wyoming College of Law, for his
excellent research assistance for this paper.
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investors could kill the venture, regardless of the merits of the investors’ claims.
Indeed, any threat of litigation, regardless of how spurious, could paralyze a new
venture.
This article ﬁrst examines the current research regarding control mechanisms
used by investors in new ventures and conﬂicts that arise between investors and
entrepreneurs. The legal environment associated with private securities litigation
is then examined in detail. Speciﬁcally, this article examines court interpretations
of the language within the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act regarding
allegations of fraud; ﬁnding that the Act, though intended to address other
perceived abuses, may actually beneﬁt entrepreneurs accused of securities fraud
in new venture ﬁnancing. This article then brieﬂy examines additional non-legal
attributes that may also favor entrepreneurs when dealing with new venture
ﬁnanciers.

Business Start-Ups and Venture Capital
The iconic perspective of modern entrepreneurship is the handful of bright,
young entrepreneurs developing their product with minimal resources, sometimes
literally in a garage, to then be “discovered” by venture capitalists who fund and
nurture the ﬂedgling enterprise until it becomes a public corporation and leader in
its industry, and, at the same time, turning the young entrepreneurs into wealthy
captains of modern industry.1
Since a start-up business does not have an established product in the market,
there are generally little to no revenues in the business’ nascent years. A small,
start-up business has a variety of sources from which it may draw operating
capital: the savings of the owners; bank loans, particularly those guaranteed by the
Small Business Administration; friends and relatives; wealthy individuals—often
referred to as “angels;” and venture capitalists.
Loans to the business are limited to the extent of the collateral of the owners
and create a repayment burden while the business is still developing. Selling part
of the business to an investor offers a viable alternative, as the amount of invested
funds is structured on the expected future value of the enterprise, and there is no
direct repayment burden.
Venture capitalists have become a signiﬁcant source of new venture ﬁnancing
in recent years. “The venture capital market thus provides a unique link between
ﬁnance and innovation, providing start-up and early stage ﬁrms—organizational
forms particularly well-suited to innovation—with capital market access that is
1

See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the
Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 38 (2006) (describing the $25 million investment in the start-up
company Google, which resulted four years later in a $4 billion public stock offering).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol8/iss1/6

2

Sprague and Page: The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the Entrepreneur

2008

PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT

169

tailored to the special task of ﬁnancing these high-risk, high-return activities.”2 By
2003, there were nearly 2,000 venture funds actively managing over $250 billion
in business investments.3 The typical venture capital process is for a venture capital
ﬁrm to form a limited partnership, with itself as the general partner. Limited
partners are then solicited to pledge funds to a particular venture fund. The
limited partners are usually institutional investors and high-wealth individuals.
The venture capital ﬁrm manages the fund, selecting in which ventures to invest.
The venture capital ﬁrm collects a set management fee, as well as shares in positive
returns earned by the fund.4
Angels, in contrast, are generally high-wealth individuals who invest directly
in a business at a very early start-up phase. While there often is some form of
personal relationship between the angel and the business owner, the availability
of angels has progressed beyond just “friends and families.” Angels have become
more prominent and accessible, even banding together into organizations to share
leads and information.5
Whether the initial venture funding is provided by an angel or venture
capitalists, it is expected that there will be subsequent rounds of ﬁnancing as
the business develops, often involving more than one venture capital fund.6
The investors’ goal is a liquidity event, usually in the form of an initial public
offering (IPO) of the stock of the venture. The IPO creates a market for the
stock of the venture, allowing the investors to sell their ownership interest in the
venture—theoretically for a substantial proﬁt.
Even where the investors and the entrepreneur are equally committed to
maximizing shareholder wealth, they may have recurring disagreements regarding
how to prioritize operating goals.7 The entrepreneur’s ultimate goal often is to
build a viable business, while the investors’ goal is a positive return on investment

2
Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons From the American Experience,
55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1068 (2003) (footnote omitted).
3
See Jeffrey M. Leavitt, Burned Angels: The Coming Wave of Minority Shareholder Oppression
Claims in Venture Capital Start-Up Companies, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 223, 223 (2005).
4

See Joseph Bankman & Marcus Cole, The Venture Capital Investment Bust: Did Agency Costs
Play a Role? Was It Something Lawyers Helped Structure?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 211, 216 (2001). See
also Gilson, supra note 2.
5
See Leavitt, supra note 3. See also Pui-Wing Tam, Fresh Crop of Investors Grows in Silicon Valley,
WALL ST. J., May 1, 2006, at C1 (discussing the rise of angel investors in Silicon Valley who were
previously start-up executives, particularly at Google, Inc.); Jaclyne Badal, Early Options, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 30, 2007, at R6 (discussing the various options entrepreneurs have for sources of start-up
capital).

See generally Michael Gorman & William A. Sahlman, What Do Venture Capitalists Do?, 4 J.
BUS. VENTURING 231 (1989).
6

7

See generally Harry J. Sapienza & Anil K. Gupta, Impact of Agency Risks and Task Uncertainty
on Venture Capitalist-CEO Interaction, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1618 (1994).
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within a few years. Strategic goals may also differ because of differences in risk
tolerance and portfolio balance. Whereas investors, for whom the company is
but one of many investments, may be willing to commit to a single strategic
target and cease participation if speciﬁc milestones are not met, entrepreneurs
may be interested in pursuing multiple strategic targets because the company is
the sole investment in the entrepreneur’s portfolio. As a result, investors and the
entrepreneur have different, and possibly conﬂicting, priorities.8
Investing in small, start-up ventures involves signiﬁcant risk.9 Risk can have
its rewards: venture funds collectively reported returns of 150% in 1999. But
risk also sometimes means loss: venture funds collectively reported returns greater
than negative 25% in 2002.10 One study has indicated that approximately 7%
of investments account for more than 60% of venture capitalists’ proﬁts, while
one-third of investments result in losses.11
There are signiﬁcant unknown variables associated with start-up ventures. By
deﬁnition, the business model of a start-up has not been tested against an actual
market. Most start-ups do not yet even have a product. It is unknown whether the
idea can be converted to a marketable product, whether a competitive product is
about to be introduced in the market, or whether the entrepreneur can manage
an operational and growing business.12 In addition, each party’s self-interests
may increase the risk of failure. Venture capitalists are only willing to provide the
minimum funds necessary for the venture to meet discrete milestones, thereby
minimizing the venture capitalists’ risk if the venture appears unsuccessful in its
early stages. At the same time, the entrepreneur is loath to give up too much
ownership and control in the business. “Thus both venture capitalists and
entrepreneurs willingly conspire to impose stringent limits on the resiliency of
their enterprises.”13 While venture capitalists and entrepreneurs may initially
believe they are a partnership which has common goals, when things go badly,
their divergent interests become painfully apparent.14

8

In particular, entrepreneurs and venture capitalists may have different interests regarding
the timing and form of exit from the business venture. See generally D. Gordon Smith, The Exit
Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA LAW REV. 315 (2005).
9
See id.; See generally Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival:
A Theory of Venture Capital-Financed Firms, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 45 (2002).
10

See Douglas Cumming & Jeffrey MacIntosh, Boom, Bust, and Litigation in Venture Capital
Finance, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 867, 869 (2004). See also Rebecca Buckman, Silicon Valley’s Backers
Grapple with Era of Diminished Returns, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2006, at A1 (noting that Silicon
Valley-based venture capital ﬁrms had negative cumulative returns for six years into 2006).
11

See Amar Bhide, Bootstrap Finance: The Art of Start-Ups, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1990,

at 109.
12

See Sapienza & Gupta, supra note 7.

13

Gorman & Sahlman, supra note 6, at 238.

14

See generally Gorman & Sahlman, supra note 6.
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Venture capitalists attempt to control risk through governance procedures.15
Studies indicate that venture capitalists pursue less industry and geographic
diversiﬁcation when investment risk is high; therefore they manage risk through
monitoring and involvement rather than through diversiﬁcation.16 When deciding
whether to fund a new venture, venture capitalists must consider more than the
potential success of the venture, and hence the positive return on investment.
Venture capitalists must also decide how best to structure the ﬁnancing to protect
their own interests while simultaneously enhancing the likelihood that the
new venture will succeed.17 The foundation of this structure is governance and
control.18
Although venture capitalists do not usually purchase a majority of the venture’s
stock, they do purchase enough to eventually control the company’s board of
directors, which has the ultimate responsibility of managing the company. The
venture capitalists’ equity investments in new ventures are typically in the form
of convertible preferred stock.19 In addition, venture capitalists provide ﬁnancing
in stages, replenishing capital only if the venture remains a potentially viable
investment.20 As the venture capitalists invest more funds over time, they generally
gain more control of the venture.21
With this level of control, venture capitalists can exert a number of powers.
For example, the venture capitalists will require disincentives for the entrepreneur
to exit from the venture, particularly by requiring that entrepreneurs sell their
interest in the company (back to the company) should they leave22 or by placing the
entrepreneurs on an equity vesting schedule.23 However, at the same time, venture
capitalists will obtain the ability to terminate the entrepreneur if they believe
15

See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 53-54 (discussing control and monitoring rights as one of the
means venture capitalists use to manage risk).
16

See generally Sapienza & Gupta, supra note 7.

17

See Smith, supra note 8, at 316 (“Before venture capitalists invest, they plan for exit.”).

18

See generally Jay B. Barney et al., The Structure of Venture Capital Governance: An Organizational Economic Analysis of Relations Between Venture Capital Firms and New Ventures, ACAD. MGMT.
PROC. 64 (1989); Utset, supra note 9.
19

See Gilson, supra note 2, at 1072. See also Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding
Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874,
875 (2003) (“[O]verwhelmingly, venture capitalists make their investments through convertible
preferred stock.”) (footnote omitted).
20

See Gilson, supra note 2. See generally Smith, supra note 8.

21

Smith, supra note 8, at 324 (“More often than not, venture capitalists do not acquire a
majority of the votes in the initial round of ﬁnancing. In subsequent rounds of ﬁnancing, the
venture capitalists build their voting power, and at some time within the ﬁrst few rounds, venture
capitalists acquire a majority of the votes.”) (footnotes omitted).
22

See Utset, supra note 9, at 66-67.

23

See generally Thomas Hellmann, The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts,
29 RAND J. ECON. 57 (1998).
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more competent senior management is needed and the entrepreneur is no longer
necessary for the viability of the venture.24 Research indicates the most signiﬁcant
reason new ventures fail is because of ineffective senior management, meaning
that venture capitalists will “frequently” ﬁre the original senior management.25
Some anecdotal evidence suggests the entrepreneurs face a much harsher reality
as they place conﬁdence in venture capitalists whose business models are based
on generating enormous returns on a small percentage of their many investments,
rather than nurturing ﬂedgling entrepreneurs. Indeed, some entrepreneurs have
thought their dreams of a successful start-up were realized when venture capitalists
agreed to invest, only to ﬁnd that they were left with nothing.26 Ultimately, if the
venture capitalists believe the venture is no longer viable, they can liquidate it,
which includes having the company buy back the venture capitalists’ stock (to the
extent there are assets to pay for the redemption).27
The entrepreneur, understandably, will more than likely ﬁght any termination
or liquidation decision by the venture capitalists. The entrepreneur is also not
necessarily powerless, if the entrepreneur holds the knowledge necessary to make
the venture viable. This may set up a conﬂict between the entrepreneur and the
venture capitalists that ultimately may be destructive to the venture. In addition,
one commentator has argued that since venture capitalists typically obtain control
of the venture in the early stages of ﬁnancing, they are essentially “locked in”
during the early stages of the investment relationship.28 If the venture capitalists
are at odds with the entrepreneur, but the entrepreneur is too valuable to the
venture to terminate or the relationship is in too early of a stage for the venture
capitalists to have control, the result may be retaliation. Angels, too, may lack
control mechanisms required for a graceful exit and feel it necessary to retaliate.
There are reputational costs associated with venture capital ﬁnancing. The
expertise of venture capitalists underlies and justiﬁes their role.29 Having to
abandon an investment altogether would negatively impact a venture capitalist’s
reputation. Abandonment because of conﬂicts with the entrepreneur would
create a high exit cost for the venture capitalist. However, research indicates that
individuals facing high exit costs may choose not to exit unfair transactions,

24
See, e.g., Reynolds Holding, Double-Crossed: Silicon Valley Entrepreneurs Say They Have Been
Betrayed By Venture Capitalists and Lawyers, The Very People They Asked for Help, S.F. CHRON., Nov.
17, 1999, at A1 (discussing an entrepreneur forced out of the company he founded two months
after venture capitalists gained control of the company’s board of directors).
25

See generally Gorman & Sahlman, supra note 6.

26

See generally Holding, supra note 24.

27

See Utset, supra note 9, at 110-11.

28

Smith, supra note 8, at 317. Indeed, Gilson & Schizer, supra note 19, argue that the use by
venture capitalists of convertible preferred stock is more for tax purposes rather than control.
29

See Bankman & Cole, supra note 4, at 219.
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choosing instead to remedy the unfairness by retaliating against the other party.30
This retaliation may be in the form of litigation ﬁled or threatened against the
entrepreneur.
In situations where an investor ﬁles or threatens suit against the entrepreneur,
some form of claim of misrepresentation, including outright fraud, will be
pursued. Although the history surrounding the development of securities law in
the United States since the 1930’s has strongly favored investors over the issuer of
securities (here, the entrepreneur), recent amendments to the U.S. securities laws
may actually favor the entrepreneur.

SECURITIES REGULATION AND LITIGATION
The stock market crash of 1929 exposed signiﬁcant shortcomings in the
regulation of the sale of securities in the United States. Post-crash, it was discovered
that billions of dollars had been invested in practically worthless securities.31
In formulating legislation to regulate the securities market, the U.S. Senate’s
sentiment was that “organizations and promoters . . . [had] sold ‘fake’ securities
throughout this country to the tune of billions of dollars, and [had] sunk their
fangs into the pocketbooks of the innocent investors with greater rapacity than
a school of sharks ever sank teeth into human ﬂesh.”32 Congressional hearings
“indicted a system as a whole that had failed miserably in imposing those essential
ﬁduciary standards that should govern persons whose function it was to handle
other people’s money.”33
In 1933, President Roosevelt recommended to Congress legislation for federal
supervision of trafﬁc in investment securities. While the federal government
would not take any action that could be construed as approving or guaranteeing
that newly issued securities are sound or will earn a proﬁt, it did impose an
obligation that every issue of new securities be accompanied by full disclosure.
Further, President Roosevelt believed that in order to protect the public, the
burden should be on the seller of securities to tell the whole truth—changing the
ancient rule of caveat emptor (let the buyer beware) when dealing with securities
to caveat venditur (let the seller beware).34
The result of the post-crash investigations were two major pieces of federal
legislation, both of which are integral to current securities markets. The Securities
30

See Utset, supra note 9, at 119.

31

See generally S. REP. NO. 73-147 (1933).

77 CONG. REC. 1018, 1019 (Mar. 30, 1933) (Change of Committee Reference of S. 875 to
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency).
32

33
James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
29, 30 (1959).
34

See generally H.R. REP. NO. 73-85 (1933).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2008

7

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 8 [2008], No. 1, Art. 6

174

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 8

Act of 1933 regulates the initial offering of securities to the public by requiring
full disclosure of all matters relevant to the securities, through the form of a
registration statement ﬁled with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and the distribution of a prospectus to all potential purchasers.35 The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 regulates transactions in securities, particularly by regulating
the activities of securities brokers and dealers and requiring companies that offer
their securities to the public to regularly ﬁle reports with the SEC.36
Since the aim of the Securities Act of 1933 is to protect the general public,
securities that are not offered for sale to the general public can be exempt from
the Act. Certain of these exempted offerings are considered “limited” because
they qualify for exemption if they meet limits in the amount of funds raised
and/or they are offered only to a limited number or class of investors. In 1982,
the SEC promulgated Regulation D37 to simplify and clarify existing limited
offering exemptions from registration and to expand the availability of these
exemptions.38
In particular, sales of securities to “accredited” investors are generally exempt
from the Securities Act. Accredited investors include institutional investors,
“insiders” (i.e., ofﬁcers and directors of the company issuing the stock), and highwealth individuals.39 A company (issuer) is under no statutory obligation to make
disclosures as long as all of the securities it offers are purchased by accredited
investors. The theory is that accredited investors are experienced, sophisticated,
and can afford to assume the risks of their investments.40
This does not mean that exempt securities are completely free of all
securities regulation.41 Regardless of the disclosure requirements from which a
security offering may be exempt, all sales of securities are subject to the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.42 The SEC enforces this
anti-fraud provision through Rule 10b-5, which makes unlawful the use of any
scheme or artiﬁce to defraud, as well as untrue statements of material facts, or the
omission of material facts.43 The Securities Exchange Act’s anti-fraud provision
may also be enforced by private parties through a civil action.44
35

15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2007).

36

15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2007).

37

17 C.F.R. § 230 (2007).

38

See Manning G. Warren, III, A Review of Regulation D: The Present Exemption Regimen for
Limited Offerings Under The Securities Act of 1933, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 355, 358 (1984).
39

17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2007).

40

See Warren, supra note 38, at 376-78.

41

See generally Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985).

42

Section 10b; 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2007).

43

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).

44

See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S.Ct. 2499, 2507 (2007).
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When new venture investors have lost control so that they are either in
disagreement with the manner in which the venture is operated and/or they are
in fear of losing their investment, they may invoke section 10b of the Securities
Exchange Act. To establish a claim for securities fraud under section 10b and Rule
10b-5, the investor must prove that the entrepreneur (1) made a misstatement
or an omission of a material fact; (2) with scienter (i.e., with knowledge of its
falsity and with an intent to deceive); (3) in connection with the purchase or
the sale of a security; (4) upon which the investor reasonably relied; and (5) the
investor’s reliance was the proximate cause of his or her injury.45 The fact that the
investor purchased the securities under an exemption that did not require speciﬁc
disclosures eliminates one possible defense to a securities fraud action—that the
information forming the basis of the alleged misstatement or omission was fully
disclosed to the investor and despite the disclosure, the investor chose to still
invest in the venture.
In theory, sophisticated or professional investors who invest in new ventures
via purchases in exempt offerings of securities, such as venture capital ﬁrms that
are also sophisticated enough to negotiate control mechanisms, generally will insist
on enough disclosures from the entrepreneur and undertake its own due diligence
to make it highly unlikely that signiﬁcant material facts can remain undisclosed
without making the disclosures they do demand either false or misleading.46
However, the current law regarding issuer disclosure obligations under the
anti-fraud provisions of federal securities laws is both unclear and complex.47 In
addition, angels, including friends and family, may not be as sophisticated and
thorough as a venture capital ﬁrm and may not ask for sufﬁcient disclosures,
creating a later opportunity to claim that material information was not disclosed.
Regardless, the mere threat to ﬁle a securities fraud claim against the entrepreneur
may be sufﬁcient to allow the investor to regain control of the venture or to force
an early buyout favorable to the investor.
Filing a lawsuit initiates a long, complex, and expensive process. A lawsuit
can achieve a certain perceived strategic advantage for the plaintiff, even if there
is no legitimate chance of culminating in a favorable verdict. From a new venture
perspective, being accused of securities fraud has a number of consequences. First,
it taints the venture. It raises the specter that the entrepreneur has misled—even
swindled—the investor. Second, it freezes follow-on ﬁnancing. It is a signal that
the investor who has ﬁled the lawsuit will not be providing future ﬁnancing. In
addition, the ﬁling of the lawsuit raises the distinct possibility—regardless of the
improbability—the venture is at risk of paying a large verdict (or settlement) in

45

See Anish Vashista et al., Securities Fraud, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 877, 880 (2005).

46

See Harry S. Gerla, Issuers Raising Capital Directly From Investors: What Disclosure Does Rule
10b-5 Require?, 28 J. CORP. L. 111, 113 (2002).
47

See id at 114.
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the near future. Investors will not invest in the venture if they believe they will be
ﬁnancing a judgment rather than actual business activities. Finally, the process of
the litigation not only extracts costs in the form of funds that would otherwise
be directed to actual business activities, but managers’ time and energy are also
diverted from the business to the litigation.
Disgruntled investors could theoretically use litigation or the threat thereof
to obtain a strategic advantage—either to force a cash-out of their investment or
a signiﬁcant change in management or business strategy. Even if the litigation
effectively ends the venture, it will at least provide a degree of liquidation from
the remaining proceeds that still possibly preserves the investor’s reputation by
signaling that the investment decision was based on the entrepreneur’s alleged
fraud rather than the investor’s poor decision-making.
The issue is how real the threat or commencement of litigation is for an
entrepreneur and new venture even when the claims are designed to extract a
strategic advantage not otherwise available through governance mechanisms.
Because the standards for ﬁling a claim for misrepresentation are so high under
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the very protections that
were originally designed in the 1933 Act to protect naïve investors in fact serve to
protect naïve entrepreneurs from sophisticated investors.

THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995
While the U.S. Congress recognizes that private securities litigation is an
indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their losses without
having to rely upon government action, it also is aware of substantial abuses in
private securities litigation.48 In 1995, Congress amended the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by enacting the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)49 to address certain perceived private securities
litigation abuses, including:
(1) the routine ﬁling of lawsuits against issuers of securities and
others whenever there is a signiﬁcant change in an issuer’s stock
price, without regard to any underlying culpability of the issuer,
and with only faint hope that the discovery process might lead
eventually to some plausible cause of action; (2) the targeting
of deep pocket defendants, including accountants, underwriters,
and individuals who may be covered by insurance, without regard
to their actual culpability; (3) the abuse of the discovery process
48

See generally H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369 (Nov. 28, 1995).

49

Pub.L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737. See generally Ann M. Olazabal, The Search for “Middle
Ground”: Towards a Harmonized Interpretation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s New
Pleading Standard, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 153 (2001) (analyzing the PSLRA).
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to impose costs so burdensome that it is often economical for the
victimized party to settle; and (4) the manipulation by class action
lawyers of the clients whom they purportedly represent.50
The main concern of Congress was the phenomenon of “professional
plaintiffs” who own a nominal number of shares in a wide range of publicly traded
companies and who “race” to the courthouse, with the aid of class-action law
ﬁrms, to ﬁle abusive lawsuits whenever stock prices drop.51 Despite Congress’
intent, the consequences of the PSLRA are more far-ranging. As the Supreme
Court has noted, a clear objective of the PSLRA is a bit more broad: to serve as a
check against abusive litigation by private parties.52 Therefore the standards and
procedures promulgated under the PSLRA can apply as well to litigation (or the
threat of litigation) arising from issues of disputed control between investors and
entrepreneurs within new ventures.
Regardless of the motive of a securities lawsuit, the reality is that it is very
expensive to defend. Most of the litigation cost—up to 80%—is incurred during
pre-trial discovery.53 The cost of discovery often forces innocent parties to settle
frivolous securities class actions. In addition, the threat that the time of key
employees will be spent responding to discovery requests, including providing
deposition testimony, often forces coercive settlements.54 Hence, the mere threat
of litigation could lead to a forced outcome favorable to a disgruntled new venture
investor.
Because a signiﬁcant portion of the PSLRA attempts to minimize the potential
for frivolous securities litigation, one important strategy of the PSLRA is to raise
the requirements for alleging securities fraud by requiring pleading fraud with
particularity. Speciﬁcally, where a plaintiff alleges that the defendant made an
untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances in which
they were made, not misleading, then the plaintiff ’s complaint must specify each
statement alleged to have been misleading, and the reason or reasons why the
statement is misleading.55 These heightened pleading requirements are so strict, it
is reported that the dismissal rates for securities fraud actions have nearly doubled
since passage of the PSLRA.56
50

H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995).

51

Id. at 32-33.

52

See Tellabs, 127 S.Ct. at 2504.

53

See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 37.

54

See id.

55

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2007).

56

See Amy J. St. Eve & Bryce C. Pilz, The Fault Allocation Provisions of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995—A Roadmap for Litigants and Courts, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 187, 187
(2006).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2008

11

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 8 [2008], No. 1, Art. 6

178

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 8

The PSLRA reinforces the heightened pleading requirements by allowing
a defendant to ﬁle a motion to dismiss the lawsuit if the plaintiff ’s complaint
fails to meet the heightened pleading requirements.57 To expedite the process and
minimize costs, discovery can be stayed while the court considers the motion
to dismiss.58 The plaintiff is also required to prove that the acts or omissions
complained of actually caused the plaintiff to suffer the loss for which the plaintiff
seeks to recover damages.59 The PSLRA also strengthens provisions for awarding a
defendant attorneys fees and costs associated with a lawsuit the court determines
was brought for an improper purpose, unwarranted by existing law, legally
frivolous, or not supported by facts.60
However, Congress’ attempts to stem securities litigation abuse created some
uncertainty. Prior to the passage of the PSLRA, securities fraud pleadings were
governed by the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.61 Although Rule 9(b) already required that fraud be
pleaded with particularity, Congress believed that that rule alone had not prevented
securities litigation abuse.62 In a securities fraud action in which the plaintiff
alleges the defendant made an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to
state a material fact (necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading), the complaint
must specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons
why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement
or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint must state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.63 And if the success of the
action is dependent upon proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of
mind, the complaint must, with respect to each act or omission alleged, state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind.64
Congress’ concern with Rule 9(b) was based, in part, on the fact that the
various federal courts have interpreted Rule 9(b) in different ways. Although
Congress recognized that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had adopted
the most stringent interpretation of Rule 9(b) (and therefore the most stringent
requirements for alleging securities fraud), Congress expressly chose not to codify
the Second Circuit’s interpretation in the PSLRA. This meant that Congress
57

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A) (2007).

58

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2007).

59

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2007).

60

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c) (2007); See also, H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 37.

61

See Tellabs, 127 S.Ct. at 2507.

62

See generally H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369.

63

See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2007).

64

See id. at § 78u-4(b)(2).
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speciﬁcally chose not to include in the pleading standard for securities fraud
certain language relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness.65 This has
resulted in confusion as to what is speciﬁcally required to successfully allege
securities fraud.66
The confusion is reﬂected in a split among various federal courts as to what
must be stated in a complaint for securities fraud. The split revolves primarily
around the standards required to establish scienter, which is a long-established
requirement for a private lawsuit under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.67 An
investor who has purchased the stock of a new venture does not have to prove
that the entrepreneur actually set out with the intent to defraud the investor.
Intent can be established indirectly—it can be inferred through the entrepreneur’s
conduct or through the surrounding circumstances. The PSLRA states that the
plaintiff must state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that
the defendant acted with scienter. Further, this strong inference may be reﬂected
by a defendant’s motive and opportunity to defraud, or through a defendant’s
recklessness. This is where the complexity and legal uncertainties lie.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals, in determining what constitutes a
“strong inference,” has suggested that a plaintiff ’s allegations must show a “high
likelihood” of scienter to satisfy the PSLRA standard.68 The court has stated that
although the inference need not be ironclad, it must be persuasive.69 “Scienter
allegations do not pass the ‘strong inference’ test when . . . there are legitimate
explanations for the behavior that are equally convincing.”70
In applying the “strong inference” language, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals has held that the
inference may arise where the complaint sufﬁciently alleges
that the defendants: (1) beneﬁted in a concrete and personal
way from the purported fraud; (2) engaged in deliberately illegal
behavior; (3) knew facts or had access to information suggesting
that their public statements were not accurate; or (4) failed to
check information they had a duty to monitor.71
65

See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41 n.23.

66

See generally Joseph T. Phillips, A New Pleading Standard Under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act?, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 969 (2001).
67
See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976) (“‘[S]cienter’ refers to a
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”); Tellabs, 127 S.Ct. at 2507 (“To
establish liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a private plaintiff must prove that the defendant
acted with scienter. . . .”).
68

In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., Sec. Litig., 431 F.3d 36, 48-49 (1st Cir. 2005).

69

See id. at 49.

70

Id. (citation omitted).

71

Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2nd Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
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The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted the requirements for
establishing a strong inference of an intent to defraud as either an allegation
of facts (a) to show that the “defendants had both motive and opportunity to
commit fraud” or (b) that “constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious
misbehavior or recklessness.”72 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, on the other
hand, has advocated a ﬂexible, case-speciﬁc analysis when examining scienter
pleadings.73 The Fourth Circuit has taken the approach that “courts should not
restrict their scienter inquiry by focusing on speciﬁc categories of facts, such as
those relating to motive and opportunity, but instead should examine all of the
allegations in each case to determine whether they collectively establish a strong
inference of scienter.”74
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that, unlike traditional fraud
pleadings, a PSLRA plaintiff is not given the beneﬁt of all reasonable inferences, but
is, under the “strong inference” requirement, “entitled only to the most plausible
of competing inferences.”75 The Sixth Circuit has also ruled that a plaintiff “may
plead scienter in [section 10b] or Rule 10b-5 cases by alleging facts giving rise to a
strong inference of recklessness, but not by alleging facts merely establishing that
a defendant had the motive and opportunity to commit securities fraud.”76
The Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits’ approaches were summarized by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals when it noted that a court may: (1) apply the
Second Circuit standard requiring plaintiffs to plead mere motive and opportunity
or an inference of recklessness; (2) apply a heightened Second Circuit standard
rejecting motive and opportunity, but accepting an inference of recklessness; or
(3) reject the Second Circuit standard and accept only an inference of conscious
conduct.77 The Ninth Circuit chose to adopt a standard somewhere between the
second and third approach: the evidence must create a strong inference of, at
a minimum, deliberate recklessness. In other words, within the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, plaintiffs proceeding under the PSLRA cannot just allege
intent in general terms of mere “motive and opportunity” or “recklessness,” but
rather, must state speciﬁc facts indicating no less than a degree of recklessness that
strongly suggests actual intent.78 Further, the Ninth Circuit has held that “when
determining whether plaintiffs have shown a strong inference of scienter, the

72

Press v. Chemical Investment Services Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (3rd Cir. 1999).

73

See Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 345 (4th Cir. 2003).

74

Id.

75

Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 553 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (citation omitted).

76

In re Comshare, Inc., Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999).

77

See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc., Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999).

78

Id. at 979.
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court must consider all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the allegations,
including inferences unfavorable to the plaintiffs.”79
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that determining whether
an inference is a strong one cannot be decided in a vacuum.80 The Tenth
Circuit did agree with the Ninth Circuit that evaluating a plaintiff ’s suggested
inference must be done in the context of other reasonable inferences that may be
drawn.81 However, that is the extent of the Tenth Circuit’s agreement with the
Ninth Circuit.82 The Tenth Circuit also rejected the Sixth Circuit’s holding that
plaintiffs are entitled only to the most plausible of competing inferences.83 The
Tenth Circuit concluded that “[i]f a plaintiff pleads facts with particularity that,
in the overall context of the pleadings, including potentially negative inferences,
give rise to a strong inference of scienter, the scienter requirement of the [PSLRA]
is satisﬁed.”84
In Johnson v. Tellabs, Inc., the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois expressly rejected the Sixth Circuit’s approach and adopted the Fourth
Circuit’s approach, holding that plaintiffs may use “motive and opportunity”
or “circumstantial evidence” to establish scienter under the PSLRA, only if
the plaintiffs’ allegations support a strong inference that each defendant acted
recklessly or knowingly.85
In Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reviewed the Northern District’s conclusions.86 First, the Makor court
concluded that in passing the PSLRA, Congress had not changed the substantive
scienter requirements.87 “Prior to the passage of the PSLRA, every [C]ircuit
to consider the substantive scienter standard . . . had held that a showing of
recklessness was sufﬁcient to allege scienter.”88 Although the Ninth Circuit appears
to have ruled that Congress did intend to change the substantive scienter standard
(i.e., that a plaintiff must allege facts that create a strong inference of “deliberate
79

Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original). “District
courts should consider all the allegations in their entirety, together with any reasonable inferences
that can be drawn therefrom, in concluding whether, on balance, the plaintiffs’ complaint gives rise
to the requisite inference of scienter.” Id.
80

See Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003).

81

See id. at 1188.

82

Id.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Johnson v. Tellabs, Inc., 303 F.Supp.2d 941, 961 (N.D.Ill. 2004), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part,
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated and remanded,
Tellabs, 127 S.Ct. 2499.
86

Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2006).

87

Id. at 600.

88

Id. (citations omitted).
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or conscious recklessness” or a “degree of recklessness that strongly suggests actual
intent”),89 the Seventh Circuit decided to apply the same scienter standard as it
did prior to the passage of the PSLRA: “an extreme departure from the standards
of ordinary care, . . . which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that
is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been
aware of it.”90
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that while the PSLRA did not change
the substantive scienter standard, it did “unequivocally raise the bar for pleading
scienter.”91 Here, the Makor court provided another overview of the various
positions taken by the courts in determining whether a “strong inference” of
scienter had been sufﬁciently pleaded. It noted that the Second and Third Circuits
had taken the position that the PSLRA adopted the Second Circuit’s pre-PSLRA
pleading standard for scienter (that plaintiffs may continue to state a claim by
pleading either motive and opportunity or strong circumstantial evidence of
recklessness or conscious misbehavior), while the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
adopted a higher burden, believing that Congress considered, but ultimately
rejected the Second Circuit’s approach.92 The Seventh Circuit, following the
remaining Circuits, decided to adopt a middle ground: “the best approach is
for courts to examine all of the allegations in the complaint and then to decide
whether collectively they establish such an inference.”93
In its ﬁrst substantive review of the PSLRA, the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari “to resolve the disagreement among the Circuits on whether, and to
what extent, a court must consider competing inferences in determining whether
a securities fraud complaint gives rise to a ‘strong inference’ of scienter.”94 Its
goal was to “prescribe a workable construction of the ‘strong inference’ standard,
a reading geared to the PSLRA’s twin goals: to curb frivolous, lawyer-driven
litigation, while preserving investors’ ability to recover on meritorious claims.”95
The procedural juxtaposition for the Circuit courts’ interpretations of “strong
inference” had been in consideration of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure motions to dismiss, which must accept all factual allegations in
the complaint as true.96 This does not change, but when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6)

89

Id. (citing In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 979).

90

Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 437 F.3d at 600.

91

Id. at 601.

92

See id.

93

Id. “Motive and opportunity may be useful indicators, but nowhere in the statute does it say
that they are either necessary or sufﬁcient.” Id.
94

Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2506.

95

Id. at 2509.

96

Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol8/iss1/6

16

Sprague and Page: The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the Entrepreneur

PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT

2008

183

motion, the inquiry is “whether all of the facts alleged, taken collectively, give rise
to a strong inference of scienter, not whether any individual allegation, scrutinized
in isolation, meets that standard.”97 Finally, “in determining whether the pleaded
facts give rise to a ‘strong’ inference of scienter, the court must take into account
plausible opposing inferences.”98
“Strong inference” is contextual. “To determine whether the plaintiff has
alleged facts that give rise to the requisite ‘strong inference’ of scienter, a court
must consider plausible nonculpable explanations for the defendant’s conduct, as
well as inferences favoring the plaintiff.”99 And, “[t]he inference that the defendant
acted with scienter need not be irrefutable, . . . or even the ‘most plausible of
competing inferences[.]’”100 However, “the inference of scienter must be more
than merely ‘reasonable’ or ‘permissible’—it must be cogent and compelling, thus
strong in light of other explanations.”101 The Court concluded that “[a] complaint
will survive . . . only if a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter
cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from
the facts alleged.”102
Addressing the issue of whether motive can give rise to a strong inference of
scienter, the Court stated that motive can be relevant, and personal ﬁnancial gain
can weigh heavily in favor of a strong inference, but the absence of a motive is
not fatal.103 Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded, “the reviewing court must
ask: When the allegations are accepted as true and taken collectively, would a
reasonable person deem the inference of scienter at least as strong as any opposing
inference?”104

97

Id. (citations omitted; emphasis in original).

98

Id.

99

Id. at 2510.

100

Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2506 (citation omitted).

101

Id.

102

Id. (footnote omitted).

103

Id. at 2511.

104

Id. (footnote omitted). A number of federal courts have quickly applied Tellabs. In
Higginbotham v. Baxter International, Inc., 495 F.3d. 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007), the ﬁrst case
interpreting Tellabs, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a complaint that relied on
conﬁdential sources did not meet the strong inference of scienter requirement expressed in Tellabs.
“[A]nonymity conceals information that is essential to the sort of comparative evaluation required
by Tellabs. To determine whether a ‘strong’ inference of scienter has been established, the judiciary
must evaluate what the complaint reveals and disregard what it conceals.” Id. at 757. See also,
Central Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Integrated Electrical Services, Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 551 (5th Cir.
2007) (holding that allegations of circumstantial evidence justifying a strong inference of scienter
will sufﬁce); Key Equity Investors, Inc. v. Sel-Leb Marketing, Inc., 2007 WL 2510385, *5 (3rd Cir.
2007) (unpublished decision) (refusing to infer scienter from vague and unspeciﬁc allegations);
Winer Family Trust v. Queen, --- F.3d ---, 2007 WL 2753734, *14 (3rd Cir. 2007) (holding that the
group pleading doctrine, a judicial presumption that statements in group-published documents are
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One issue the Tellabs Court expressly did not address is whether reckless
behavior is sufﬁcient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.105 Every
Circuit that has considered the issue has held that scienter may be established
by a showing of recklessness.106 Recklessness, in the context of securities fraud, is
generally deﬁned as “an act so highly unreasonable and such an extreme departure
from the standard of ordinary care as to present a danger of misleading the plaintiff
to the extent that the danger was either known to the defendant or so obvious
that the defendant must have been aware of it.”107 This “severe recklessness” is well
beyond negligence, and, in essence, falls slightly below intentional conduct.108
Plotkin v. IPaxess, Inc. exempliﬁes how these standards are applied when an
investor sues a company for securities fraud.109 In Plotkin, the investor (Plotkin)
sued on the basis of three allegedly false and misleading press releases used to
induce Plotkin (and others) to invest in the company. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that Plotkin had established a strong inference of fraudulent intent
with respect to omissions in one of the press releases.110 The court concluded that
Plotkin had alleged speciﬁc facts about agreements with strategic partners giving
rise to a strong inference that the company knew or was severely reckless in not
knowing at the time of the releases that the strategic partners were not able or
were not likely to be able to make the payments they contracted to make.111
Similarly, in EP Medsystems, Inc. v. Echocath, Inc., the plaintiff-investor sued
for securities fraud after four “imminent” contracts supposedly under negotiation
with companies that would market the defendant-company’s products fell through
after the plaintiff made its investment.112 The court believed a strong inference of
fraud could be established where multiple promised events fail to occur.113 The

attributable to ofﬁcers and directors who have day-to-day control or involvement in regular company
operations, is inconsistent with the PSLRA’s requirement that scienter be pleaded with respect to
each act or omission by the defendant); Oppenheim Pramerica Asset Management S.A.R.L. v.
Encysive Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2007 WL 2720074, *3 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (holding that conclusory
assertions of knowledge and falsehoods are insufﬁcient to withstand the defendants’ motion to
dismiss); and In re Ditech Communications Corp. Securities Litigation, 2007 WL 2990532,
*10 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that defendants’ sale of personal stock while promoting ﬁnancial
soundness of corporation were not “suspicious enough” to raise a strong inference of scienter). See
also generally, Foster v. Wilson, ---F.3d ---, 2007 WL 2893608, (9th Cir. 2007).
105

See Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2507 n.3.

106

See Ottmann, 353 F.3d at 343.

107

Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted).

108

Id. at 344.

109

Plotkin v. IPaxess, Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 690 (5th Cir. 2005).

110

Id. at 693, 699.

111

Id. at 699-700.

112

EP Medsystems, Inc. v. Echocath, Inc., 235 F.3d 865, 869-70 (3d Cir. 2000).

113

Id. at 881.
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court could not dismiss the possibility that the defendant-company, in an effort
to coax a substantial investment, did not fairly represent to the plaintiff-investor
the status of its negotiations with these companies.114
In contrast, the suing investor in R2 Investments LDC v. Phillips failed to meet
the strong inference of scienter requirement.115 In R2 Investments, the investor
sued the company after it failed (due to bankruptcy) to complete a tender offer
to repurchase certain previously issued notes.116 The plaintiff-investor essentially
argued that the company had not disclosed the liquidity crisis it was going through
at the time of the investment.117 Even if the company had knowingly omitted
material facts about its ﬁnancial condition, the court held that “[k]nowledge
of an omission does not itself necessarily raise a strong inference of scienter.”118
The court held that the plaintiff-investor had not alleged a clear motive for the
alleged misstatements or omissions, therefore, “the strength of its circumstantial
evidence of scienter must be correspondingly greater.”119 Essentially, the court
concluded the plaintiff had not alleged that the company’s executives were aware
of anything beyond worst case scenarios. Due to there being potential alternative
funding sources, coupled with the plaintiff ’s failure to allege any motive, the court
concluded the plaintiff had failed to allege a strong inference the defendants “acted
with an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud or that severe recklessness in
which the danger of misleading buyers or sellers is either known to the defendant
or is so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it.”120
As to motive, the court in GSC Partners CDO Fund v. Washington held that
allegations that the defendant ofﬁcers stood to beneﬁt from the transaction in
question is not sufﬁcient.121 “[C]atch-all allegations that defendants stood to
beneﬁt from wrongdoing and had the opportunity to implement a fraudulent
scheme are no longer sufﬁcient, because they do not state facts with particularity
or give rise to a strong inference of scienter.”122 A plaintiff must assert a concrete
and personal beneﬁt to the individual defendant resulting from the fraud.123
“In every corporate transaction, the corporation and its ofﬁcers have a desire to
complete the transaction, and ofﬁcers will usually reap ﬁnancial beneﬁts from a

114

Id.

115

R2 Investments LDC v. Phillips, 401 F.3d 638, 643 (5th Cir. 2005).

116

Id. at 639.

117

Id. at 643-44.

118

Id. at 644 (citation omitted).

119

Id. at 645 (quoting Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1068 (5th
Cir. 1994)).
120

R2 Investments LDC, 401 F.3d at 645 (citation and internal quotations omitted).

121

GSC Partners CDO Fund v. Washington, 368 F.3d 228, 237 (3d Cir. 2004).

122

Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted).

123

See id.
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successful transaction. Such allegations alone cannot give rise to a ‘strong inference’
of fraudulent intent.”124
The heightened PSLRA pleading standards provide a signiﬁcant hurdle
for plaintiffs alleging securities fraud.125 The authors’ research reveals a dearth
of individual private plaintiff-investors suing a privately owned enterprise for
securities fraud. As for large groups of investors alleging securities violations, the
Stanford Law School Class Action Clearinghouse, in cooperation with Cornerstone
Research, tracks class action securities ﬁlings.126 It its 2007 Mid-Year Assessment,
the Clearinghouse reported that 2007 marked the fourth consecutive six-month
period with below average securities class action ﬁling activity.127 In addition, Rule
10b-5 claims in the ﬁrst half of 2007 represented 81% of total ﬁlings, compared
to 88% in all of 2006.128 The Clearinghouse has suggested two hypotheses for the
drop in securities class action ﬁlings: less fraud (resulting from increased SEC and
Justice Department enforcement activities) and a strong stock market (essentially
less volatility in the market leads to fewer disgruntled investors).129
The Clearinghouse’s ﬁndings may reﬂect a recent trend. Professor Perino
studied nearly 1,500 class action ﬁlings from 1996 through 2001, concluding the
stated goals of the PSLRA (discouraging the ﬁling of non-meritorious lawsuits
and the “race to the courthouse”) were not accomplished.130 Perino does, however,
suggest that higher pleading standards relating to securities fraud improved overall
case quality (driving out weaker cases).131 In addition, Professor Choi et al. found
evidence that pre-PSLRA claims that would have settled for nuisance value would
be less likely to be ﬁled under the PSLRA.132 With the higher pleading standards

124

Id. (citations omitted).

125

See Olazabal, supra note 49, at 196 (concluding that “the PSLRA’s pleading requirements
make it substantively more difﬁcult for a plaintiff to clear the pleading hurdle and to proceed to
discovery in a class action securities fraud case. . . .”).
126

See Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse in Cooperation with
Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Case Filings: 2007 Mid-Year Assessment, available
at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2007_YIR/20070710-01.pdf (tracking
federal securities class action ﬁlings since the beginning of 1996 through June 22, 2007).
127

See id. (no pagination).

128

See id. (no pagination).

129

See id. (no pagination).

See Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, COLUM. L. SCH.
WORKING PAPER SERIES, Working Paper No. 211, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=346840.
130

131

See id. at 36-37.

132

See Stephen J. Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, JOHN M. OLIN CTR. FOR L. & ECON., Working Paper No. 07-008, available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=975301 (ﬁnding evidence also that fewer suits resulting in non-nuisance settlements
would be ﬁled under the PSLRA, compared to pre-PSLRA, and that for the suits ﬁled, fewer nonnuisance settlements would occur under the PSLRA).
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for alleging securities fraud, the legal environment supports the argument that
disgruntled new venture investors will be less likely to sue (or even threaten to
sue) for securities fraud.

ADDITIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR ENTREPRENEURS
Regardless of the state of securities law, there are additional factors that
can impact any potential disputes over control of an enterprise. It is presumed
that when an entrepreneur is negotiating with potential investors, the relative
power of the entrepreneur and investor largely determine who receives the greater
beneﬁt from the investment—and, hence, greater control. It is also presumed
that where the entrepreneur has more power, there is less likelihood for litigation.
An entrepreneur’s personal and resource attributes can enhance his or her power
relative to the investor.
While many entrepreneurs are new to the market for venture ﬁnancing, other
entrepreneurs have repeated experience. Entrepreneurs have been described as
“novice” entrepreneurs, who have no prior business ownership experience; “serial”
entrepreneurs, who have sold or closed a business in which they had an ownership
stake and currently have an ownership stake in new, independent business; and
“portfolio” entrepreneurs, who have concurrent ownership stakes in two or more
independent businesses.133 The latter two categories suggest that experience in
entrepreneurship increases the entrepreneur’s power for three reasons. First,
experience provides the entrepreneur with a basis for comparison when negotiating
with investors. Second, an experience curve effect may enable the entrepreneur to
capitalize on his or her existing knowledge base and internal infrastructure, thereby
reducing costs of capital. Third, experience is likely to generate credibility on the
part of the entrepreneur.134 The entrepreneur’s experience is used by potential
investors to screen applications for assistance.135 Thus, not only will experience
help the entrepreneur to see the relationship with the investor and the actual
terms in a more sophisticated light, experience will also allow the entrepreneur to
be seen by the investor as more capable and credible. Therefore it is arguable that
entrepreneurs with more entrepreneurial experience will have more power relative
to investors than entrepreneurs with less entrepreneurial experience.
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See generally Paul Westhead et al., Decisions, Actions, and Performance: Do Novice, Serial,
and Portfolio Entrepreneurs Differ?, 43 J. SMALL BUS. 393 ¶ 2 (2005) available at 2005 WLNR
25307723.
134

See id.
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See generally Paul Westhead & Mike Wright, Contributions of Novice, Portfolio and Serial
Founders Located in Rural and Urban Areas, 33 REGIONAL STUD. 157 (1999); see also, Ian MacMillan
et al., Criteria Used by Venture Capitalists to Evaluate New Venture Proposals, 1 J. BUS. VENTURING
119, 121 (1985).
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Expert power is demonstrated when an individual has knowledge or expertise
relevant to another.136 One commentator has suggested that the hallmark of
expertise is the ability to adjust one’s skills to be adaptive and successful even in
the face of changes in situational demands.137 In venture ﬁnance situations, it can
generally be assumed that the investor has more ﬁnancial knowledge and expertise
than most entrepreneurs. However, to the extent that the entrepreneur has his or
her own ﬁnancial expertise, the entrepreneur’s power relative to the investor will
be enhanced. It is therefore arguable that entrepreneurs with ﬁnancial expertise
will have more power relative to investors than entrepreneurs without ﬁnancial
expertise.
Rare substantive expertise in the entrepreneur’s ﬁeld may also enhance the
entrepreneur’s power, particularly when the ﬁeld is a popular one for venture
capital. Where the value of the enterprise lies within the entrepreneur, it is less
likely that the investor will jeopardize the relationship with the entrepreneur
than if the value lay within physical assets or intellectual property. It is therefore
arguable that entrepreneurs with rare expertise in their ﬁelds will have more power
relative to investors than entrepreneurs without rare expertise in their ﬁelds.
Speciﬁc experience or training in negotiations should also give entrepreneurs
power in their negotiations with investors. One study has found that while both
expert and amateur negotiators were able to reach integrative solutions over
time, expert negotiators were more integrative early in the negotiations and
tended to secure higher average outcomes than amateur negotiators.138 Another
commentator has found that experienced negotiators make more accurate
judgments about the other party’s priorities and are more likely to negotiate more
favorable agreements.139
It can be expected, then, that entrepreneurs who are experienced negotiators
will be able to negotiate more favorable terms than will novice negotiators. It
is therefore arguable that entrepreneurs with speciﬁc training or experience in
negotiations will have more power relative to investors than entrepreneurs without
training or experience in negotiations.

136
See generally John R. P. French & Bertran Raven, The Bases of Social Power, in STUD. IN SOC.
POWER 150 (Dorwin Cartwright ed., 1966).
137
See generally Donald W. Fiske, The Inherent Variability of Behavior, in FUNCTIONS OF VARIED
EXPERIENCE 326 (Donald W. Fiske & Salvatore R. Maddi eds., 1961).
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PROCESSES 305 (1986).
139
See Leigh Thompson, An Examination of Naïve and Experienced Negotiators, J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 82 (1990).
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Even where an entrepreneur has some personal attributes that may be
advantageous in negotiations with investors, the entrepreneur is likely to
strengthen his or her power through the accumulation of certain resources that
are also likely to enhance power. These include strong intellectual property, loyal
board members, high-status alliance partners, high-status legal counsel, and an
advisory board.
Theft of intellectual property, euphemistically called “competitive intelligence,” is an important concern for every entrepreneur. Legitimate investors are
acutely concerned with the protectability of entrepreneurs’ intellectual property;
the stronger the protection, the more valuable is the property. Less legitimate
investors will be concerned for other reasons; the weaker the protection, the easier
it is to appropriate.140 In either event, strong intellectual property protection
should provide more power to entrepreneurs than weak intellectual property
protection. It is therefore arguable that entrepreneurs who have strong intellectual
property protection will have more power relative to investors than entrepreneurs
with weaker intellectual property protection.
While it is often the case that investors will insist on board of directors
seats, and even board control, loyal investors at least provide some buffer to this
power.141 It is therefore arguable that entrepreneurs with loyal members on the
board of directors will have more power relative to investors than entrepreneurs
without loyal members on the board.
A number of scholars have argued that if an individual’s partners possess
considerable legitimacy or status, then the individual may derive legitimacy or
status through that afﬁliation. This “borrowed” legitimacy or status has been
shown to have a number of positive economic beneﬁts for the actor, ranging from
survival to organizational growth to proﬁtability.142
In one of the more compelling demonstrations of the economic value of ties to
high-status actors, one scholar examined the economic effects of interorganizational
networks of privately held biotechnology ﬁrms and found that an afﬁliation with
a prominent alliance partner increased the market value of the biotechnology
140

See e.g., Holding, supra note 24 at A1 (discussing one incident in which an entrepreneur
sought funding from a venture capital ﬁrm only to discover that the very next day a new company
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ﬁrm).
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ﬁrm.143 Consistent with an interpretation of these ties as carriers of legitimacy, the
effect of afﬁliations varies inversely with the age of the start-up.144 In other words,
young start-ups beneﬁt more from the status of their network partners than did
older start-ups. It is therefore arguable that entrepreneurs with high-status alliance
partners will have more power relative to investors than entrepreneurs without
high-status alliance partners.
Just as high-status alliance partners may be a signal of quality and hence give
an entrepreneur more bargaining power, so too may the status of the entrepreneur’s
general counsel. Some law ﬁrms are known in the venture ﬁnance industry as
higher status and more connected, knowledgeable, and capable than other law
ﬁrms. Thus, such law ﬁrms may provide the entrepreneur with power relative
to the investors in at least two ways. First, such law ﬁrms may suggest a certain
sophistication on the part of the entrepreneur that will translate into more respect.
Second, the expertise of the law ﬁrms themselves in the domain of venture capital
should inure to the beneﬁt of the entrepreneurs through good legal advice. It is
therefore arguable that entrepreneurs with high-status legal counsel will have more
power relative to investors than entrepreneurs with low-status legal counsel.
One commentator has recommended that entrepreneurs create “quasi-boards
of directors” or advisory boards to allow the entrepreneurs to gather expert advice
without imposing on the advisors the legal or ﬁduciary burdens of being board
members.145 These advisors can offer advice without becoming embroiled in
operations or politics. Such advice can beneﬁt the entrepreneur in two ways when
negotiating with investors. First, the existence of the board of advisors signals that
the entrepreneur is willing to listen to independent, outside advice. Second, the
advisors can provide invaluable advice with respect to the negotiations themselves.
It is therefore arguable that entrepreneurs with an advisory board will have more
power relative to investors than entrepreneurs with no advisory board.

CONCLUSION
Investors in new ventures who are unhappy with the state of their investment
may wish to regain control of the venture or exit the venture through liquidation.
When either of those strategies becomes extremely difﬁcult, investors may
resort to retaliation by threatening to ﬁle a securities fraud lawsuit against the
entrepreneur. The securities legislation passed in 1933 and 1934 favored the naïve
investor over the sophisticated issuer, a situation that could be detrimental to an
entrepreneur—a relative naïve issuer selling to a sophisticated investor.
143
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Although Congress had other culprits in mind—“professional plaintiffs,”
encouraged by corrupt class-action plaintiffs’ lawyers, “racing” to the courthouse
whenever a publicly-traded company’s stock price dropped—when passing
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, its consequences are apparently
favorable for entrepreneurs who may face serious disagreements with investors.
Although initially there was some disagreement among the courts as to the precise
requirements to plead the strong inferences of scienter required by the PSLRA, the
Supreme Court has stepped in to clarify the pleading requirements, reinforcing
the fact that the PSLRA has created a signiﬁcant hurdle to ﬁling securities fraud
actions. And some of the preliminary data indicate Congress has been successful
in decreasing the number of securities fraud lawsuits ﬁled in U.S. federal courts.
There are a number of personal and resource-based attributes of entrepreneurs
that can enhance their power when negotiating the terms of investments in their
companies. These power attributes, coupled with the heightened PSLRA pleading
standards, should make entrepreneurs less vulnerable to claims of securities fraud
when investors ﬁnd they are not pleased with their investment.
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